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The Road to Transformation
Ascending from the Decade of
Darkness
Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley

N

obody likes mistakes. Fewer yet like to revisit
errors – to analyze, discuss or study them.
They are often an embarrassment and remind us
of our fallibility and shortcomings. It is always
much easier to celebrate our achievements and
successes – that leaves everyone with a warm
feeling. However, although it is always preferable
to avoid making mistakes, once they occur
they are important and must be recognized as
such. They speak to our weaknesses as both
individuals and institutions. They are signals, if
not alarms, to warn us of deficiencies that must
be addressed. In fact, it has often been said for
good reason that one can learn more from one’s
mistakes than from one’s successes.
The military has always been bad at accepting
this premise. Mistakes are often construed as a
sign of weakness or inability and many perceive
them as potential career-ending events. Such a
zero tolerance to mistakes breeds an environment
of risk aversion, micro -management and
stagnation. It kills initiative and experimentation.
And, it avoids examining mistakes in detail – lest
blame insidiously spread its evil tentacles and
taint others in the chain of command. However,
this state affairs leads to atrophy within an
organization.
It takes strong will and determination to break
such a cycle. Normally, crisis is the only catalyst
that compels leadership within an organization
to take action, and even then it is difficult. The
Department of National Defence (DND) and the
Canadian Forces (CF), particularly the officer
corps, found themselves in such a situation in
the late 1980s and 1990s. By 1997, they were
at the lowest ebb of their history. They had lost
the confidence and trust of the government

and Canadian people they served. They were
stripped of their ability to investigate themselves.
Furthermore, they were not trusted to implement
the recommended changes forced upon them
by the government and an external committee
was established as a watchdog. Whether the
leadership wanted to admit it or not, and they
vehemently denied it at the time, there existed
some substantial and deep rooted problems with
DND, the CF and the officer corps. They were
caught in a decade of darkness.
The road to this sad state was a long one. The
assault on the CF and its senior leadership in the
late 1980s and into the 1990s was cataclysmic.
The well known Cold War paradigm, with its
clear polarities of “us” and “them” disappeared
almost overnight. The new security environment,
marked by complexity, ambiguity, enemies and
threats embedded in failed and failing states and
an ever present media, overloaded a traditional,
conservative and intellectually inflexible officer
corps that saw the world in terms of absolutes.
As if this was not enough, a government facing
debilitating fiscal deficits looked to the military
for a post Cold War “peace dividend” to solve
part of its problem. Like all parts of government
operations military spending came under sharp
scrutiny even as available funds were slashed.
These pressures stressed the CF. Scandals
and the bungled attempts at dealing with them led
to the loss of government trust and a widespread
loss of trust on the part of Canadian society.
As the military’s failures, notably incidents of
wrongdoing overseas, as well as reports of opulent
or unethical spending and behaviour by senior
leaders surfaced, Canadians quickly became
incensed. Exacerbating this situation was a DND
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The cold war had a major impact on international relations,
but in retrospect it was a relatively simple period for the
military as it provided them with a clearly deﬁned mission.
Right: Lester Pearson, Canadian minister of external
relations, signs the North Atlantic Treaty,
Washington, DC, 4 April 1949.

leadership that was not accustomed to criticism
or scrutiny by the public. The clear and present
Soviet threat and spectre of nuclear Armageddon
had always been enough to distract and silence
critics. So they did what they always did,ignore
the noise in the expectation that it would go away.
They refused to explain themselves or provide
information. They ignored or stonewalled queries
believing that that the storm would blow over.
If the winds were too strong they could always
shelter behind the well tested barrier of “national
security” and the condescending, if not arrogant,
attitude that civilians should just leave military
business to the professionals. That attitude only
accelerated and deepened the government’s and
Canadians’ loss of confidence.
So, what happened? Canadians, much like
the populations of most western nations, have
never believed in large standing armed forces, and
regarded the inherently conservative professional
military with mistrust. However, in the aftermath
of the Second World War, when two ideologically
opposed superpowers, the United States and the
Soviet Union, emerged from that conflict, the
world changed dramatically. Exacerbating the
political and military competition between these
former allies of convenience was technology. The
war had sparked exponential advancements in
warfare; jet engines, large aircraft carriers and
submarines, rockets and nuclear weapons made
the world that much smaller, and countries that
much more vulnerable.

In 1949, the West created the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) as a hedge against
perceived Soviet intentions of westward expansion.
Soon after the Soviets created the Warsaw Pact,
dragooning its occupied territories into an
alliance to protect them from their fear of Western
aggression, and Europe was divided by an “iron
curtain.” This European centric contest soon
became a global contest, with much of the world
falling into one camp or the other. Faced with
the prospect of nuclear Armageddon if the major
antagonists faced off directly, the superpower
competition soon played itself out in proxy wars
in Korea, Africa, and the Middle East.
Throughout, one thing always seemed
certain: the Cold War was just a breath away from
becoming a hot war in which the superpowers
could scarcely avoid using their nuclear arsenals.
The only apparent safeguard against war was
large Western standing forces to deter Soviet
aggression.
This state of affairs had a great impact on
Canada and its armed forces. For the first time
in its history Canada maintained large standing
forces. In fact, Canada deployed a substantial
force overseas, including a heavy mechanized
brigade group and a division of fighter aircraft.

34
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As well, the navy’s expansion to more than fifty
warships in the 1950s was primarily to support
Allied forces in Europe. These large NATO
commitments quickly became the raison d’étre of
the CF despite the fact that Canadian government
policy always attempted to retain a robust second
pillar for foreign and defence policy anchored in
the UN. This created ongoing, albeit low grade,
tension in civil-military relations.
T h e C o l d Wa r, d e s p i t e i t s p o s s i b l e
consequences, was in retrospect a simple era
for the military. The threat seemed frighteningly
real. Pictures of huge missiles pointed towards
North America, impressive May Day parades
in Moscow that revealed a large and very lethal
military arsenal, the continued Soviet occupation
of territory liberated from Germany in the
Second World War and the brutal suppression
of nationalist movements therein, reinforced the
need for large Western forces. In the event this
was not enough, every year (coincidentally around
budget appropriation time) the US Department
of Defense published its glossy The Soviet
Menace, which showcased the Soviet Union’s
bulging military arsenal. In sum, governments
and their publics could easily recognize the
threat. Accordingly, the military was provided the
necessary budget and generally left to secure the
Western way of life in the prosperous post war
era.
The military had a clear mission, to counter
the Soviet threat. Governments generally left
that mission’s implementation to the military
professionals. National security dictated secrecy
and the Soviet’s active espionage campaigns,
which often were made quite public once
compromised, reinforced the need for a heavy
cloak of secrecy on all things military. As a result,
the military could easily hide behind this veil to
avoid explaining those things it preferred not to
discuss. A very closed mindset developed, one
that avoided public disclosure and was indeed
contemptuous of it. The military knew best,
and those who did not serve could not possibly
understand the intricacies of national security.
A second aspect of the simplicity of the Cold
War was the operating environment. The world
was largely divided into two spheres, NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, and each was careful not to
interfere prominently in the other’s sphere. The
containment of such events as the Hungarian

Revolution in 1956, the Cuban Missile Crisis in
1962, and the Czechoslovakian Revolution in
1968 (Prague Spring) provide clear examples of
the unwritten understanding that existed. When
a superpower became involved in a regional
war, as in Vietnam, the Middle East, Angola, or
Afghanistan, the other, even while supporting the
enemy, did so in a manner calculated to avoid
direct confrontation. Equally important, both
camps generally ensured that the particular
regimes or insurgencies they supported did not
unduly challenge the global status quo.
Even peacekeeping during this period fell into
the clearly understood model. Peacekeepers were
only employed when both antagonists agreed
to their presence. Their role was to monitor a
ceasefire or peace agreement once the fighting
had stopped. Their employment was always
within a prescribed boundary, the buffer zone
between the two former warring parties. The
operating environment was very clear. Each side
was clearly delineated by its front line and all
participants were in clearly identifiable national
uniforms. Moreover, there were rarely civilians
or press to deal with, and when they did visit, it
was under carefully controlled circumstances.
Once again, the military was allowed to operate
in almost complete isolation.
The relative simplicity of the operating
environment bled into the very fabric of the
institution. The Cold War bred a technologycentric culture. What became important was
one’s capability of being a technically proficient
warfighter. After all, the enemy was almost
perfectly symmetrical, nearly a carbon copy of
its antagonist. Weapons inventories and tactics
were designed to fight a conventional (and
possibly nuclear) war against forces of a similar
type. Everything had a clear template. Soldiers,
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers
were taught Soviet order of battle and tactics.
Exercises revolved around standard scenarios,
such as the arrival of the combat reconnaissance
patrol of a mechanized motor rifle division,
which would indicate exactly what the enemy
consisted of and where he was located. Based on
the distances from friendly front lines, it could
now be determined what tactics he would adopt.
In essence, the key to training was learning the
enemy’s order of battle. Training institutions
provided lessons, handbooks and exams on the
Soviet enemy. Students would memorize the
35
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organizational composition (including numbers
of personnel, specific weapons and their ranges,
vehicles and tactics) from section level to division
and higher depending upon rank level.
NATO policy and doctrine, dictated largely
by the “Big Boys” of the organization, relieved
Canada of much of the burden of strategic, as well
as operational, decision making. Canada’s tactical
role, whether on the Central Front in Germany or
its Allied Command Europe (ACE) AMF(L) [ACE
Mobile Force (land)] role in Northern Norway,
reinforced the simplicity of the Cold War for the
CF. It knew its role, its routes to the front, its
actual fighting positions and the exact enemy it
would face. Much of the training revolved around
rehearsals for the possible showdown between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the actual ground
and exact fighting positions where this would
happen.
Within the CF, the Cold War nurtured the
traditional military concept that leadership is a
top-down hierarchical action that depends on
unit command and experience in specific types
of staff appointments to prepare individuals
for higher command at the strategic level.
Within this model, higher education had little
importance. It stressed training (a predictable
response to a predictable situation) to the virtual
exclusion of education, a reasoned response to an
unpredictable situation, that is, critical thinking
in the face of the unknown.
In fact, a rabid anti-intellectualism thrived.
Those seeking higher education (a masters
degree, as a PhD was unfathomable) were deemed
suspect; they were obviously trying to prepare
themselves for a life outside the military. What
was important within the military hierarchy were
individuals who understood the system: the
operating environment; the Soviet enemy; NATO
doctrine and standard operating procedures; and
Canadian equipment, tactics, and staff work.
Significantly, this fervent anti-intellectualism
denuded the officer corps of individuals capable
of, or willing to undertake, analysis, critical
thinking, reflection and visioning in the larger
geo-political and societal context. The inherently
conservative and traditional military mind frame,
compounded by its hierarchical, authoritative
and closed structure fed a system that not only
ignored, but actively closed itself to, outside
thought and criticism.

CF leadership doctrine embodied an industrial
era model that focused on output. In essence, if
the mission was successful, the commander had
by definition showed leadership, whether the
task was completed in spite of the commander
or not. If the task failed, the commander was
obviously let down by his subordinates. Clearly,
within such a model, mission success at any cost
became the key factor. Throughout the Cold War
commanders cloned themselves and thereby
they assumed they ensured the well-being of the
institution. Through the years, the myopic view
and isolation created an officer corps that was
intolerant of criticism, self-scrutiny or wider
intellectual stimulation. Experienced Cold War
technicians, who did not rock the boat and
supported the status quo, tended to do well.
In 1987, the Conservative government’s
bold Defence White Paper, Challenge and
Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada,
was welcomed with open arms by the military.
It represented a reinforcement of the Cold War
mentality, large conventional forces such as heavy
mechanized forces in Germany and nuclear
submarines. It also represented a halt to the
continual downward spiral of defence spending
that started in 1964, with the Liberal White Paper,
and remained unabated ever since. However, the
Conservative White Paper proved to be fleeting in
its influence, and that did not bode well for the
CF.
The destruction of the Berlin Wall in December
1989, which is now universally accepted as the
end of the Cold War, left the CF and its leaders at
a loss. What now? The Cold War was over. We had
won. Moreover, the government and the public
expected a peace dividend. With the Soviet threat
eliminated, why maintain large military forces?
Moreover, the Canadian government was facing
a colossal deficit that was dragging down the
national economy, devaluing the Canadian dollar
and scaring off foreign investment. DND, with the
largest discretionary budget of any government
department, became a natural target.
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The new world order quickly began to unravel.
Former proxy states of the superpowers, now
left to their own devices without the necessary
economic subsidies to survive, or the security
infrastructure to hold together fragmented ethnic
and culturally diverse populations, quickly
spiraled into chaos. Failed and failing states
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Appalled by the scenes of horror and
inhumanity beamed into living rooms by the nightly
news, publics soon pressured governments to
act. As a result, the West as individual countries,
as well as a collective entity under UN auspices,
soon dispatched military forces to bring order to
the chaos. But, the attempts were awkward and
ineffective. Manpower ceilings and equipment
tables contrived to cut costs for the “peace
dividend” and a politic desire not to present too
warlike an image to the publics in the West fell
short of providing the troops and the resources
needed on the ground. Attempting humanitarian
aid peacekeeping operations in an environment
where there was still an active war in progress
and where none of the belligerents welcomed the
interference of UN troops created frustration,
risk, and inefficiencies for the soldiers of the
missions. The difficulties also showcased the
UN’s ineffectiveness in the new world order.
Member nations were unable to reach consensus,
and unwilling to provide mandates with the
necessary level of force; for these reasons the
international organization was unable to provide
the necessary command and control structure
to react in a timely and effective manner, and
missions floundered.
From the CF perspective, troops were sent
into harm’s way without adequate resources,
rules of engagement or
coherent engagement policy.
At the same time the CF was
deploying a record number of
troops on an unprecedented
number of operations even as
The role of peacekeeping was
also a clearly understood model.
Peacekeepers were only employed
when both antagonists agreed to their
presence. Their role was to monitor
a ceaseﬁre or peace agreement
once the ﬁghting had stopped. Their
employment was always within a
prescribed boundary, the buffer zone
between the two former warring
parties.
Here, members of the peacekeeping
mission to Cyprus meet with
representatives from Greece and
Turkey, August 1974,

its budget was being slashed. From 1989 to 2001
the CF deployed on approximately 67 missions
compared to 25 missions during the period 1948
to 1989. Yet, in 1994 to 1999 alone, the CF was
reduced from approximately 90,000 to 60,000
personnel, civilian staff was cut almost in half
and the annual military budget was slashed by
almost $2.7 billion, representing a 23 percent
reduction.
At this time of extreme institutional stress,
Canadian contingents in the Former Yugoslavia,
Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda had
incidents of unprofessional and in some cases
criminal behaviour. Questionable shootings
and other disciplinary infractions, particularly
drunkenness, as well as black marketeering and
the misappropriation of funds and resources
created scandals. There were also revelations in
Canada of questionable practices, particularly
the use of government resources for personal
purposes by senior officers in DND. The
bombardment of negative press eroded the CF’s
credibility.
It was the torture killing of a teenage detainee
by Canadian soldiers in Somalia on 16 March
1993 that proved to be the catalyst that sparked
the implosion of the CF officer corps. The killing
was horrific enough. It tarnished the international
image of the “do-gooder” Canadian peacekeeper.
Moreover, it assailed the Canadian public’s
perception of its soldiers who seemingly no longer
represented Canadian ideals or values. What

United Nations Photo

mushroomed. In their wake civil war, ethnic
cleansing and genocide erupted on the global
scene.
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made a bad situation worse, however, was DND’s
response to the crisis. Faced with increasing
criticism from the media and the public at large,
the senior DND leadership, both civilian and
military, decided to stonewall the detractors.
Falling back on their Cold War experience and
mindset, they attempted to ignore the criticism
and, when this failed, they selectively released
information often in a misleading manner. These
tactics quickly led to charges of a cover-up at the
highest levels in National Defence Headquarters,
which later were proved to have substance.

In turn, the Commission, frustrated by an
apparently obdurate officer corps, produced a
scathing report, finding that “a failure of military
values lies at the heart of the Somalia experience.”
Of the 160 recommendations in the report, 112
were leadership and management related. The
Minister of National Defence (MND) ultimately
endorsed a total of some 250 recommendations
for change, including the vast majority, 132 out
of the 160, put forward by the commission, and
many others from his own Report to the Prime
Minister, the Report of the Special Advisory

Leopard I tanks of 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade on exercise in Germany, 1987.

Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre LRC86-057-4

For the Canadian officer corps this was a low
point in its history. As a corporate group it was
unable or unwilling to realize that the world no
longer fit the archaic Cold War paradigm in the
face of substantial and significant geo-political
and societal changes. Its failure to uphold a
healthy military ethos, the values, beliefs and
expectations that reflect core Canadian values
and the imperatives of military professionalism,
was catastrophic.
The general election of 1993 swept in a
new Liberal government. Tiring of the public
criticism and frustrated with the seeming lack of
cooperation from DND, the new administration
established the Commission of Inquiry into the
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia to
examine the events and causes of the killing in
Somalia. Not fully understood by many in the
military, this action was decisive. It indicated that
the government no longer trusted the military
to investigate itself, and thereby stripped a key
attribute of any profession, self-regulation, from
DND and the CF. Although many tried to deny the
implication, the CF officer corps had reached a
new low.

Group on Military Justice and Military Police
Investigative Services; the Report on the QuasiJudicial Role of the Minister of National Defence,
and the Report of the Special Commission on the
Restructuring of the Reserves. The accepted
recommendations covered virtually all aspects
of the functioning of the DND and CF.
However, confidence in the military’s
leadership had sunk to such a low level that
the government also established a Minister’s
Monitoring Committee on Change in the
Department of National Defence and the
Canadian Forces (MMC) to “monitor progress
with respect to the implementation of change…”
General Maurice Baril, a former Chief of the
Defence Staff (CDS) conceded, “Undeniably,
the 1990s represented the first strong test of
the contemporary Canadian officer corps and
we found part of it was broken.” He added
“experience in and of itself was not enough.”
This realization should not have been a
revelation. Thirty years earlier, another former
CDS had already alluded to the danger. “It
matters little whether the Forces have their
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present manpower strength and financial budget,
or half of them, or double them,” warned General
Jean V. Allard, “without a properly educated,
effectively trained, professional officer corps the
Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the
best mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.”
The military, because of its anti-intellectual
and conservative nature as a corporate body,
simply ignored Allard’s warning and the warnings
of many others. Certainly the requirements for
officer education, training, and professional
development has been a long-standing concern.
As early as 1947, Brooke Claxton, the MND,
asserted that officer training was “one of the
most important matters to be dealt with in the
organization of the Armed Forces.” Indeed, officer
professional development (OPD) has been the
focus of myriad studies. In 1947, the Inter-service
Committee on Officer Training recommended
that a university degree be the entry standard
for any officer. In addition, it suggested that the
Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and
Royal Roads Military College in Esquimalt be
established as tri-service military colleges where
aspiring officers would receive their university
education. This was substantially implemented,
and in 1952, a third service college, le Collège
Militaire Royal (CMR) was opened at St Jean,
Quebec to ensure francophones had an equal
opportunity. Nevertheless, despite the existence
of the three service colleges and the creation
of a Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) that
subsidized officer cadets who attended civilian
universities, only a third of all serving officers
actually possessed university degrees during the
1950s and 1960s. Although the Canadian officer
corps was highly credible and well-respected by
its allies in the post–war era, detractors were
concerned that the system of officer development
was unable to create a bilingual officer corps, and
there seemed to be a large leakage of expensivelyeducated and well-trained officers who left the CF
before normal retirement age.
In 1969, as a result of the upheavals resulting
from unification of the forces, the department
created an Officer Development Board (ODB)
under Major-General Roger Rowley, the personal
choice of the CDS, General Allard. Rowley
determined that an OPD system had to satisfy
three imperatives. First, all officers had to fully
understand the philosophy and ethic of their
profession, and be able to devote themselves

spiritually and rationally to its services. Second,
all officers had to master an effective level of
expertise. Lastly, he believed all officers had
to be given the opportunity fully to develop
their intellectual potential. Concomitantly, he
explained that the OPD framework had to be
rooted in a clarity of mission and in a set of
moral imperatives that ODB called the “Canons
of the Military Ethic.” These canons were Duty
to Country, Duty to the Service, Duty to Other
Members of the Profession, Duty to Subordinates,
and Personal Responsibility.
The ODB also recognized the university
degree as the foundation of professional expertise
and reiterated that it had to be the academic
threshold for entry into the officer corps. The
Board concluded that OPD had to be provided
through an integrated and holistic system of
education and training that would take an officer

from the pre-commissioning stage through to
senior rank levels. The critical component of the
envisioned framework was the Canadian Defence
Education Centre, where the intellectual and
spiritual core of the officer corps would reside.
It was from this institution that the concepts
of military professionalism and officership,
essential for the future effectiveness and well
being of the armed forces, would be developed.
The OPD system recommended by Rowley never
came to fruition, although some measure of its
39
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continuing validity is provided by the fact that
much of it would be resurrected by LieutenantGeneral Robert Morton’s Officer Development
Review Board some 25 years later.
Professional development for senior officers
became the focus of analysis during the 1980s.
The crux of the matter was the fact that the
Canadian Forces Command and Staff College,
whose candidates were normally of major’s
rank, was the last formal training for the vast
majority of senior officers. Although the National
Defence College existed for top level national
and international studies, its enrollment was
limited to an annual military course load of twelve
individuals. This was insufficient, particularly
in light of the increasing complexity of national
security issues and the demanding environment
at NDHQ where since the early 1970s the top
military and civil service appointments, together
with high-level policy and administrative
functions, had been fully integrated.
Major-General C.G. Kitchen, assigned in
1985 to address the issue, emphasized the
social-political dynamic in which he believed
the military profession, as part of society, had
to be fully capable of participation. The CF, he
concluded, had to furnish its officers with more
and better opportunities for university studies,
especially at the graduate level, and preferably
at civilian universities. This idea, however, was
quickly torpedoed by another study conducted
by Colonel David Lightburn, who deemed the
concept impractical. The Lightburn study, tabled
in 1986, argued that the answer to senior officer
OPD lay within a more structured yet flexible
framework centered on national security studies
rather than simply tinkering and adapting the
existing system and creating new institutions and
programs. In 1988, Lieutenant-General Richard
Évraire tabled a paper that made three important
recommendations. First, he noted that a special
course applicable to each environment should be
developed for senior commanders. Second, job
related short courses and seminars should be
created. Finally, he argued for the establishment
of a centre for national security studies. More
generally, Évraire emphasized necessity of CF
personnel policies that directly supported officer
education and training.
None of the initiatives gained much traction.
In fact, with the end of the Cold War and the

severe budgetary cutbacks of the 1990s, OPD
took a major hit. The National Defence College,
the CF Staff School and two of the three military
colleges (Royal Roads and CMR) were closed.
In 1994, General John de Chastelain, the
CDS, commissioned the Officer Devlopment
Review Board (ODRB) under chairmanship of
Lieutenant-General (retired) Robert Morton
to “review the education and professional
development required by Canadian Forces
Officers during their careers and recommend
a programme which meets the requirements of
a professional Officer Corps of the future.” In
all, Morton’s committee made 280 implicit and
explicit recommendations. They insisted that the
flawed officer professional development process
in the CF was rooted in a defective and inadequate
Officer General Specification (OGS). They also
argued that there were major gaps in OPD
philosophy, including “a need to develop a regime
of professional development that has a military
ethos woven into all aspects.” The major failing of
the OGS was to define all elements of the military
profession, particularly the importance of the
military ethos. Furthermore, it did not define the
specific training and education requirements for
the four stages of officer development. In essence,
the ODRB reiterated to a large degree the same
conclusions and recommendations of the Rowley
report 25 years earlier.
Throughout, the Morton report stressed
education as a cornerstone of OPD. It set the
minimum education standard for officers
at post-secondary school qualification, with
the ultimate objective for all officers, except
those commissioned from the ranks, being
a university level baccalaureate degree. The
Queen’s Commission was to be recognized as the
formal entry point into the profession of arms.
Integral to the commission and throughout an
officer’s service was the requirement for “an
exemplary understanding of the ethos of the
CF, a commitment to duty…a high standard of
leadership…and the specific knowledge base and
critical thinking abilities demanded of a military
officer.”
Thus the ODRB insisted that military ethos
and ethics were core elements of OPD. They
formed the framework within which officers
accomplished their tasks. They also set the
officer corps apart from civilian professions. As
a result, each developmental period (DP) of an
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officer’s career should be designed to provide
for these requirements. While DP 1 was the
formative component of the system because of its
critical role in shaping the professional character
of newly joined officers, the remaining DPs
should also be tailored to reinforce, mature and
emphasize the leadership, ethos, and knowledge
attributes of officership.
However, any OPD framework would be hollow
if it did not have a sound, fully articulated military
purpose. Morton recognized that the “primacy
of warfighting” had to be incorporated into all
aspects of the CF OPD system. Furthermore,
the system also had to satisfy certain social and
political imperatives. This included reflecting the
bilingual nature of the nation Canada, as well as
recognizing Canadian societal expectations such
as the CF’s role in peacekeeping. To implement
the new OPD system, Morton insisted that “a
statement that outlines a flexible but well-defined
philosophy and system within which OPD can
function effectively and evolve in a timely manner”
must be created. He argued such a document was
necessary in order to construct the framework
within which coordinated and related policies
could be developed. Morton also believed this
would provide the authority and rationalization
for resources needed to support OPD.
The Morton Report was not well received
by the CF. Some reforms were implemented,
including a review of the OGS to address
some of its deficiencies, as well as to attempt
to ensure that the document reflected the
needs of the CF officer corps in the post-Cold
War environment. An Officers’ Professional
Development Handbook was written embracing
Morton’s OPD model of four developmental
pillars within four officer developmental stages.
However, the ODRB Report’s overall requirement
for a total and comprehensive restructuring of the
OPD system was ignored. The 282 “implicit and
explicit recommendations” that the OPD working
group identified in the report were determined
to be “unmanageable.” Instead, the ODRB Report
was dissected and subsumed into the larger and
increasingly strained CF staffing process. Those
recommendations that were accepted still had to
compete for scarce funds for realization. In the
resource strapped environment this was fatal.
In the end, the ODRB recommendations had
very little effect on the restructuring of the OPD
system.

However, the crises in the 1990s, combined
with the Canadian societal shift, which author
Peter C. Newman described as a movement
from deference to authority to one of defiance,
forced the government and military to
transform. No longer could either hide behind
a veil of national security. The public demanded
accountability, responsibility and transparency
from its government and military. As a result,
the message, which had been resisted for so
long, finally sunk in. “The Army was forced to
change,” conceded Lieutenant-General Mike
Jeffrey, a former commander of the army, “I
mean forced.” He added, “The challenge is not
to forget those institutional failures took place.
We had significant failures.” This message has
not been lost. The tragedy in Somalia sparked a
virtual reformation of the CF officer corps and
the institution itself.
New appraisal systems and succession
planning processes were undertaken, which
importantly diluted the influence and power
of unofficial “regimental councils.” Moreover,
DND established a Canadian Military Journal
to provide a forum for professional discourse,
discussion and debate and it undertook a public
affairs policy that was based on transparency
and accuracy. The department put increasing
emphasis on its obligations under the access
to information legislation. It also undertook a
multitude of initiatives that addressed issues
from employment equity, soldier and family
quality of life, to more fiscally responsible
management practices. With regard to professional
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development, a series of steps were taken, some
concurrently, some sequentially.
One significant early initiative was the
establishment, in 1998, of the Royal Military
College Board of Governor’s Study Group, chaired
by General (retired) Ramsey Withers, a former
CDS. The study group, established outside the
normal chain of command of the CF Recruiting
and Education System (CFRETS) and the
Associate Deputy Minister for Human ResourcesMilitary (ADM(HR-Mil)), had direct access to the
Minister of National Defence. The eight month
study made two major recommendations,
out of a total of 65. The first called for a new
model for new entry officer training, called the
Enhanced Leadership Model (ELM). The second
insisted that consideration should be given to
the establishment of a CF University within the
context of CFRETS. The first recommendation
launched a seven year process culminating in
a modified ELM focused on the early military
socialization of new officer entrants. The second
required even greater pressure and took longer to
overcome bureaucratic inertia and other barriers
to its final realization.
In February 1999, the CDS appointed the
first ever Special Advisor to the Office of the
CDS for Professional Development (SA-PD).
The first incumbent was Lieutenant-General
Roméo Dallaire. The office was created in part
to demonstrate to the Minister’s Monitoring
Committee that a concerted effort was being made
to address leadership issues of direct concern to
that committee’s mandate. Even more so than
the case of the Wither’s Study Group, it was very
important that the SA-PD operated outside the
chain of command and reported directly to the
CDS on a weekly basis.
Given the rank and reputation of the SAPD this created considerable tension and even
animosity between his office, CFRETS, ADM(HRMil) and to some extent the VCDS. The lack of
effective communication with the latter officer
was indeed unfortunate since the VCDS oversaw
the concurrent work being done to produce the
important overarching CF strategy document,
Defence Strategy 2020. This strategy did provide
a suitable framework for the SA’s work and
over time the VCDS began to see the merits of
Officership 2020.

Over the course of a year the SA’s office
developed the Statement of Requirement (SOR)
for Officer Professional Development entitled
Officership in the 21st Century. The SA’s office
maintained a good relationship with the MMC
and the committee was supportive of its work
while at the same time tabling reports critical
of the rest of the department’s response to
the minister’s report to the Prime Minister. In
the MMC’s opinion, at this stage the CF was
still proposing tactical solutions to strategic
problems. The MMC considered the focus of the
SA’s office more appropriate.
Officership in the 21st Century was a
compelling document that broke the log jam
in the PD system and led to fundamental
change. In essence, the SOR recommended the
disbandment of CFRETS and, in more detail
than in the Wither’s Report, described the
requirement for a CF University. The SOR also
strongly recommended the establishment of a CF
Leadership Institute responsible for research and
the creation and promulgation of doctrine and
concept development in regards to leadership
and the profession of arms. This institute was
created in 2001, very shortly after the publication
of Officership in the 21st Century.
Armed Forces Council considered the SOR
at the end of 1999. Although there was general
support for several of its themes, there was great
consternation that the document did not have
sufficient “buy-in” throughout the department.
Over the previous year numerous attempts at
collaboration by the SA’s staff had been either
ignored or rebuffed. Caught in something of
a dilemma, with his own SA’s advice being
challenged by his senior staff, the CDS directed
that the SOR go through another round of analysis
with widespread participation throughout the
CF. This was duly undertaken using the socalled “Empowerment Model.” A series of large
working group meetings, in three tiers – junior,
intermediate and senior ranks – took place over
the next six months. Ultimately, the revised SOR,
now entitled Officership 2020, received formal
endorsement by both the CDS and the Minister
of National Defence.
This was a critical moment in the
transformation agenda discussed in this article.
With the support not only of the minister, but
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to be developed. To be sure, there was, and still is,
considerable resistance to the new construct that
envisages a much higher educational component
in NCM PD and new, more demanding, roles
and responsibilities for NCMs. This in turn
necessitates a different approach to the officer/
NCM team. Nonetheless, considerable progress
is being made.
In terms of structure, the major result of NCM
Corps 2020 was the establishment of the NCM PD
Centre in St. Jean, Quebec. The centre is now the
focus for innovative thinking about NCM PD and
the delivery of modern, challenging leadership
courses from the rank of master-corporal to chief
petty officer 1st class/chief warrant officer.

also now by both the CDS and the VCDS, real
progress could be made. Officership 2020
set eight strategic objectives for the long-term
professional development of the officer corps.
Importantly, it also specified concrete initiatives
to make such progress possible. Of particular
note was yet another endorsement of the CF
University concept to ensure that the education
pillar of professional development would receive
the much needed attention that it deserved.
Secondly, Officership 2020 proposed the
creation of three CF wide capstone manuals: the
profession of arms in Canada manual to define,
describe and explain the concept of Canadian
military professionalism; a leadership manual
to update leadership doctrine last reviewed in
the 1970s; and a CF strategic doctrine manual
to provide the context for PD for the next 20
years. While beginning the research to write
these manuals, the SA’s office also turned its
attention to the non-commissioned member
(NCM) corps. If possible, Canadian NCMs were
more mired in the Cold War mind-set than the
officer corps. In addition, if the officer corps was
to be fundamentally reformed what needed to be
done with NCMs? Four senior, experienced chief
warrant officers were added to the SA’s staff and
an extensive analysis of the NCMs was conducted.
The result was NCM Corps 2020, a strategic
document that initiated a virtual paradigm shift
in the concept of the NCM Corps and how it was

While the SA’s Office was working on NCM
Corps 2020 the VCDS engaged the services
of a private consulting firm to examine and
make recommendations concerning the overall
structure of common PD throughout the CF.
Based on the work done in the Wither’s study,
the Dallaire SOR and Officership 2020, they
focused on the concept of a CF University. The
original idea in the Wither’s study that such
an organization could be created within the
CFRETS framework had failed. CFRETS simply
could not understand the vision. Consequently,
the consulting firm’s strong recommendation
was to establish what was now referred to as
the Canadian Defence Academy, with the Royal
Military College of Canada (RMC) and the CF
Leadership Institute (CFLI) acting as its academic
engines.
The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was
officially opened in 2002, while CFRETS was
disbanded. The new Academy Headquarters
consisted of CFLI, the Directorate of Professional
Development (DPD) and the Directorate of
Learning Management (DLM). CFLI was to be
the conceptual and philosophical engine of the
formation, DPD was to direct the delivery of PD
products and DLM was to develop new techniques
and processes to deliver education and enhance
life-long learning throughout the CF. At that
time CDA encompassed RMC, the CF College in
Toronto and Campus Fort St. Jean, including
the Management School and the NCMPD Centre.
When CDA stood up the SA’s office was disbanded
and some of the staff moved to CFLI. Work had
already started on two of the capstone manuals
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directed in Officership 2020, the profession of
arms manual and the leadership doctrine. This
work would now be completed by CFLI.
By 2003, the first publication was ready.
Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in
Canada was a seminal work that addressed
many of the underlying problems of the previous
decade in terms of professionalism. It defined
professionalism as comprising four attributes:
responsibility, expertise, identity and professional
ideology. The latter attribute represents a claim
to a specialized, theory-based body of knowledge
and contains the Canadian military ethos. As
mentioned earlier, the Somalia Commission’s
report had stated explicitly that a failure of
military ethos lay at the heart of the crisis, and
Duty With Honour was designed to deal directly
with this conclusion. To be sure the department,
in response to the commission’s report, had set
up the Defence Ethics Program, which produced
The Statement of Defence Ethics. However, this
document fell far short of the requirements of a
truly military ethos.
D u t y Wi t h H o n o u r d e v e l o p e d t h e
comprehensive “Statement of Canadian Military
Ethos” which comprised chapter two of the
manual. The ethos comprises three components:
“Beliefs and Expectations of Military Service”
(unlimited liability, fighting spirit, teamwork and
discipline); “Fundamental Canadian Values”; and
the four “Core Military Values of Duty, Loyalty,
Integrity and Courage.” This ethos, together with
the common concept of military professionalism
espoused in the manual now serves as a unifying
force promoting a CF identity within which nests
the strong single service identities of the Navy,
Army and Air Force. It now serves as the doctrinal
base throughout the CF’s PD System.
The next capstone manual addressed was,
in fact, a suite of three manuals published in
2005-6: Leadership in the Canadian Forces:
Conceptual Foundations, and two applied
manuals, Leading the Institution and Leading
People. Conceptual Foundations established a
values-based leadership construct based on the
military ethos contained in Duty With Honour.
The construct identified a primary leadership
outcome and three enabling outcomes. These

were mission success, member well-being and
commitment, internal integration (e.g. morale,
cohesion) and external adaptability (i.e. accept,
anticipate and lead change).
Based on this model Leading the Institution
addressed system level issues such as stewarding
the profession, visioning and change and being a
military strategist in practical terms. It targetted
senior officers and NCMs and was written
with the experiences of the 1990s clearly in
mind. Leading People is concerned with direct
leadership at all levels. It emphasizes the military
ethos and ethical decision-making and provides
practical guidance with regard to achieving
mission success while keeping the three enabling
outcomes in appropriate balance.
The road to transformation did not end
with the distribution of the first editions of the
CF capstone manuals. If anything the terrorist
attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, the
publication of the Defence White Paper in 2005,
Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan and the
appointment in February 2005 of General Rick
Hillier as the CDS, had demonstrated yet again
the ubiquitous nature of change. Perhaps now,
more than ever, there is a requirement for a highly
educated and trained, experienced officer and
NCM corps.
The new phase of CF transformation initiated
by General Hillier in 2005 affects the strategic,
operational and tactical levels of war and conflict.
It will require a highly motivated, well educated
and skilled Force for its full realization. Starting
down the road to transformation in the period
1997-2006 is just that – a good start. Only if the
anti-intellectual, mechanistic and linear mindset characteristic of the Cold War has been truly
rooted out will the CF be able to prevail in the
complex and deadly battlespace of the early 21st
century. The Canadian Defence Academy has a
pivotal role to play in the rest of the journey.
Colonel, Dr. Bernd Horn is the Director of
CFLI. Dr. Bill Bentley is the Section Head,
Professional Concepts at CFLI. Both are
adjunct associate professors of history and
political science respectively at RMC.
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